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Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises: 
An Econometric Case Study of Mondragon* 
 
We provide the first econometric study of efficiency for a member of the Mondragon group of 
worker cooperatives. Eroski is a retail distribution chain and, most unusually, there are two 
distinct types of hypermarkets: (i) cooperatives with significant employee ownership and 
voice; and (ii) GESPAs with modest employee ownership and limited voice. For 
supermarkets the chain includes conventional firms with no employee ownership as well. Our 
key data are a panel of monthly observations from February 2006 through May 2008, a total 
of 9,800 observations for supermarkets and 2,150 for hypermarkets. By estimating first 
difference models we find that hypermarket stores with cooperative ownership grow sales 
significantly faster than GESPA stores. For supermarkets overall we find no significant 
difference in performance among the three types of stores. However, for a particular segment 
of the supermarket called SUPERMARKET CITY (a subgroup of small supermarkets for 
which having “better customer service” employees is particularly important), cooperatives are 
found to outperform conventional stores. To investigate mechanisms that help explain why 
cooperatives are better performers we provide additional evidence that takes account of the 
role of the more extensive opportunities for employee involvement and training, and stronger 
economic incentives that exist in cooperatives. Finally, while cooperative members are better 
paid than their peers in comparable firms, individual-level data also show that job satisfaction 
is actually lower for workers in cooperatives than for GESPA workers. Though this may be a 
simple reflection of high worker expectation in cooperatives, cooperatives may well be indeed 
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Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises: 
an Econometric Case Study of Mondragon 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The recent economic crisis has stimulated much interest amongst researchers and policy 
makers concerning the possibilities of alternative ways to structure economic organizations. One 
option is shared capitalism, characterized by a variety of financial participation programs (such 
as profit sharing, gain sharing, employee ownership, and broad-based stock options), all of which 
make workers significant stakeholders of the firm (Kruse, Freeman and Blasi, 2010). Perhaps the 
most powerful form of shared capitalism is an enterprise in which workers are majority owners, 
with responsibility for key strategic decisions, such as worker cooperatives.  
Mondragon is often considered the most successful example of such employee-owned 
enterprises in the world. Founded in 1956 with some 25 workers in the Basque Country of Spain, 
Mondragon was originally a group of mainly industrial worker-owned enterprises. Subsequently 
the group has grown to include firms in other areas, notably retail and finance, and it extends 
across Spain, Europe and the globe.  By 2008, Mondragon comprised about 250 cooperatives, 
subsidiaries and affiliated organizations, including 73 manufacturing plants overseas, altogether 
employing almost 100,000 (see http://www.mcc.es/.) 
There has been a long-standing interest by diverse scholars on various matters concerning 
the Mondragon cooperatives (e.g., Johnson and Whyte, 1977, Bradley and Gelb, 1982). Since 
these early studies, Mondragon has continued to grow -- by some estimates Mondragon 
represents the seventh largest consortium in Spain (e.g., Arando et al., 2011) Moreover, facts 
such as no job losses ever having been sustained by cooperative members, including during the 




regularly (e.g., Joshi and Smith, 2008).  At the same time, a conspicuous characteristic of the 
vast bulk of the published literature on Mondragon cooperatives is that there have been few if 
any applied studies that use standard hypothesis-testing methods. Thus on one of the key 
questions of interest to economists, the efficiency of the Mondragon cooperatives compared with 
conventional firms, most published work has been restricted to comparisons using efficiency 
indicators that are quite aggregated, for example comparisons at an industrial or overall group 
level between cooperatives and conventional firms (e.g., Thomas and Logan, 1982.)  
The limited nature of the research on Mondragon cooperatives contrasts with the more 
general literature concerning employee owned firms. The first econometric studies of the 
performance of firms in which there is substantial/majority employee-ownership firms (EOFs), 
often considered as producer co-operatives (PCs) or labor managed firms (LMFs) appeared more 
than 30 years ago (e.g., Jones and Backus, 1977.) Work has continued to flow including 
influential studies of the U.S. plywood cooperatives (Craig and Pencavel, 1995) and, more 
recently, on worker cooperatives in Uruguay (Burdin and Dean, 2009.). There is also a growing 
literature that usually focuses on more modest examples of employee ownership, including the 
shared capitalism literature for the US (e.g., Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, 2008), European 
countries (e.g., Pendleton and Robinson, 2008 for the U.K), transition economies (e.g., Estrin et 
al, 2009) and Japan (e.g., Jones and Kato, 1995.) As well as the issue of comparative 
performance, this broader literature, notably the “High-Performance-Workplace-Practices” 
literature, considers other matters including the mechanisms that underpin performance 
differences (e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003.)  
However, the issues that are examined concerning employee owned firms are still not 




balance of evidence demonstrates better performance by PCs compared to participatory capitalist 
firms, other assessments, including Bonin et al. (1993:1305) and Dow (2003:184) are not so 
sanguine. Concerning the performance of PCs, this ambivalence is particularly apparent when 
evaluation is restricted to studies that endeavor to make comparisons between PCs and 
conventional firms within the same industry (for a review, see, e.g., Dow, 2003:184.) By 
providing new evidence for a Mondragon case on comparative performance and underlying 
mechanisms we also contribute to many of these debates. 
Our study is facilitated because we are fortunate to have access, for the first time, to two 
types of primary data. Most important we have data for the population of stores in the Eroski 
retail chain, with Eroski by far the largest employer within the Mondragon group today. By using 
these new panel data we provide the first econometric study of efficiency for any Mondragon 
cooperative. Moreover, growth in the chain has resulted in there being large numbers of 
individual stores that have three distinct categories of employee ownership, ranging from 
significant (the cooperatives), through limited (known as GESPA) to zero (conventional stores). 
Cooperatives also have large numbers of workers who are not (yet) members and in GESPA 
stores many workers choose not to become members. These panel data enable us to contrast the 
impact on efficiency of both cooperative and limited employee ownership with conventional 
ownership and also to investigate the potential importance of some of the key mechanisms that 
might account for differences in performance. In addition we have individual level data for 
workers in cooperatives and GESPA stores that allow us to examine issues surrounding job 
satisfaction. 
Our method is an insider econometrics case study (for a review of this and closely related 




the literature on EOFs, especially majority EOFs, has adopted a firm-level approach. While this 
is a valuable method, as is widely recognized there are potential problems with this empirical 
strategy including issues surrounding measurement error, endogeneity and omitted variables. The 
case study approach enables more thorough investigation of the ramifications of important 
institutional realities in cooperatives, e.g. the co-existence of member and non-member workers, 
issues which typically are not afforded central attention in larger firm-level studies. Thus by 
providing what is apparently the first econometric case study of a firm with substantial employee 
ownership, potentially we provide a valuable complement to the body of findings derived from 
firm level studies, as well as a contribution to a literature that is of growing importance.  
The plan of this paper is as follows.  The next section highlights key institutional features 
of our case and uses new data to provide descriptive statistics. In the third part we review key 
theoretical and empirical literature in areas of interest. In the main section of the paper we first 
describe the first difference approach that is the basis of our estimating framework as well as our 
econometric findings. We follow this by providing additional evidence that relates to some of the 
mechanisms that underpin our key empirical findings on comparative performance. We also 
analyze new data on job satisfaction for workers in cooperatives and GESPAs.  In the final 
section we offer concluding remarks and discuss the implications of our study. 
 
II. The Case, Institutional Framework and Descriptive Statistics 
 Our case is the Eroski chain which is headquartered in Northern Spain. The Eroski group 
is a diversified company with different activities including sport and leisure outlets though its 




Both supermarkets and hypermarkets stores sell similar items, although there is some variation in 
the range of items sold, since the outlets are of different size ranging from floor space of 1950 
sq.m. to 12, 853 in hypermarkets and 162 to 2500 sq. m. for supermarkets. Smaller supermarkets 
carry a product assortment essentially in the food area that is a subset of the product mix offered 
by larger stores. Each hypermarket is divided into three basic divisions-- food, clothing and 
domestic goods. A key strategy is to sell rather standard products to a wide range of customers 
with all items in stock on display, and self-service is the main form of service in most 
departments. For the bulk of employees the main tasks are to receive goods, shelve items, and 
maintain the appearance of their department. In departments such as specialized foods it appears 
that customers are apt to call on the expertise of sales clerks more often than in other 
departments such as basic foods. 
The overwhelming bulk of these retail outlets are in Spain (2398 of 2441), with the 
remainder in France and Andorra, though amongst those 2398 units it is the 109 hypermarket 
stores and 705 supermarket stores that are at center stage. Total employment in 2007 was 50, 587 
and on the basis of total retail space Eroski was the third largest retail chain in Spain in that 
year.1
  To enrich our understanding of the institutional realities at the case we read various 
materials that the company provided and we also made repeated visits to the firm headquarters 
where we have had extensive discussions with senior personnel. Many of these personnel had 
made frequent and recent visits to branch stores and thus had intimate knowledge of these 
branches. We have also spent considerable time on field trips including multiple visits to outlets 
 
                                                 
1To allow for adjustment costs, in our study we will focus on hypermarket and supermarket stores 
that have been part of the Eroski chain for at least 6 months. There is no newly acquired store in our sample 




of this company in the Basque region as well as different areas of Spain; during each of these 
visits we interviewed the store manager and employees.  
 The retail chain began operations in Northern Spain in 1969. Most of the cooperatively 
owned stores are in the Basque region and in these cooperatives employees have substantial 
employee ownership. To sustain growth in the chain (and with an eye to becoming a leader in 
retailing throughout Spain), in 1997 Eroski began to acquire or open stores in other parts of 
Spain. Some of these stores are cooperatives. In others, known as GESPA, employee members 
have ownership stakes, though they are more modest than in cooperatives. Other stores remain as 
conventional firms.  Hence, from the perspective of the extent of employee ownership, there are 
three distinct types of store. In turn, these ownership differences result in considerable 
differences in the structure and functioning of stores in the three categories.2
These differences are most apparent for worker-members in Eroski cooperatives who, 
compared to workers elsewhere in Eroski, have unusual opportunities to participate in both 
ownership and decision-making. Equally it is important to realize that, usually, there are non-
member workers in the workforce. While many of these “non-members” are prospective 
members on probation, they also include workers on temporary contracts. In the main it appears 
that workers on temporary contracts are quite low skilled, in such positions as cashiers.  As is 
shown in the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 in hypermarkets this non-member 
workforce in Eroski cooperatives, averages about 24% of the total workforce and is somewhat 
higher in supermarkets.  
   
Effectively all coop workers who work under permanent contracts are expected to 
                                                 
2 We should also note that Eroski, as are other MCC cooperatives, is supported by a web of 




become members and, as such, significant worker owners. While there is no fixed probationary 
period, at some point (usually not less than six months) the immediate supervisor of the 
candidate for membership, after soliciting opinions of other coop workers, makes a 
recommendation with the ultimate decision concerning membership being made by the store’s 
manager. In selecting prospective members, a key requirement is the willingness and ability of 
the candidate to commit to a substantial capital contribution, a sum that currently is about 6000 
Euros which in 2009 amounted to about 30% of the average annual remuneration in an Eroski 
store3. While this initial stake remains substantially individually owned, about 20 % of it is 
allocated to collectively owned reserves. The member’s stake receives an interest rate that is 
related to, though usually set above, the market rate --in 2008 it was 8%. Over time, as Eroski 
makes profits, these individual stakes grow as distributions from surpluses are credited to these 
individuals’ capital accounts.4
Cooperative members also have opportunities to participate in decision-making in ways 
substantially beyond those available to workers in other Eroski stores. Thus worker-members are 
able to attend the AGM (Annual General Meeting), though the large number of members 
requires that this is done on a representative basis. More importantly perhaps, worker-members 
are able to be elected to the Governing Council (the Board of Directors) and the Social Council 
(the body responsible for determining many matters of interest to workers, such as working 
 From Table 1 we see that in hypermarkets the average size of 
these stakes was quite considerable having grown to 33,295 Euros and in supermarkets to more 
than 26,000 Euros by March of 2008. 
                                                 
3 However the capital contribution requirement is not as onerous as it appears since it can be 
spread over 5 years. In addition, possibilities exist for some new members to use previously paid 
unemployment premia towards these stakes, since cooperative members are guaranteed job security. 
4 For more detail on these features of Mondragon cooperatives, see Thomas and Logan, 1982 and 




conditions.). At the same time, the potential influence of worker members in Eroski cooperatives 
is necessarily circumscribed since, unlike in manufacturing cooperatives, there is another large 
group of members in Eroski, namely consumer-members. The Governing Council comprises 
equal numbers of representatives for worker- and consumer-members. Finally cooperative 
members participate in joint labor-management meetings at the store level. From Table 1 we see 
that,  as a proportion of scheduled working hours spent in such meetings per month (INVOLVE) 
averaged 0.24 percent for workers in COOP Hypermarket stores. 
The understandings and implicit policies concerning job security and remuneration are 
potentially of crucial importance to the functioning of cooperatives. A key incentive for workers 
to want to become and to remain as coop members is job security—no coop members have ever 
been laid off.5 In addition, cooperatives have wage structures that are much more compressed 
and more flexible than in firms outside the group. Thus the norm is for coop members in non-
managerial positions to receive a premium of at least 20% over their outside counterparts. Also 
the internal wage differences are compressed, with the usual ratio of top-bottom not exceeding 
5:1.6
Turning to the Eroski stores known as GESPA, as in cooperatives individuals can 
become members and have individual ownership stakes though membership in GESPA which 
requires a capital stake that is about half as large as in a coop, about 3,000 Euros. This represents 
about 25% of the average annual earnings for workers in a GESPA store. However, and unlike in 
 As such top managers tend to receive lower earnings than do managers in conventional 
retail stores (by some estimates about 30% below outside rates.) 
                                                 
5 There have been occasional instances of store closures. In such instances members are always 
offered comparable employment in nearby Eroski stores. 
6 There are some strategic positions for which the gap is higher, sometimes approaching within- 
business differences of 8:1. Still these differences are much more compressed than in comparable 




cooperatives, not all permanent workers in Eroski stores are required/expected to become 
members. In particular, when the stores were acquired, existing workers were not obliged to 
become members. However, new workers who are offered permanent contracts are expected to 
become members. These individual membership stakes earn an interest rate determined in a 
similar way to individual stakes of coop members. Over time, as Eroski makes profits, these 
individual stakes grow as distributions from surpluses are credited to individuals’ capital 
accounts. However reflecting lower initial levels and shorter average life—the first GESPA 
began in 1997, whereas cooperatives have existed since 1969—as of March 2008 the average 
individually owned stake in GESPA was substantially less than in Eroski cooperatives. Thus 
from Table 1 we see that in GESPA hypermarkets this STAKE averaged only a little over 2,500 
Euros.7
                                                 
7 The average stake of 2,500 Euros is actually lower than the amount of the initial capital contribution 
required for GESPA membership (3,000 Euros). This seemingly anomalous finding is largely due to the fact 
that the initial capital contribution required for GESPA membership can be spread over five years, and that as a 
result of the relatively young age of GESPA stores many GESPA members have not completed their required 
capital contribution.  
 Membership in GESPA, as with membership in cooperatives, provides what is 
effectively 100% job security—no GESPA members have ever been laid off, and in the few 
instances of GESPA store closures, members have always been offered alternative employment 
nearby. However, while GESPA members are able to be elected to the Social Council, they are 
ineligible to attend the AGM or serve on the Board. As such the scope and nature of a member’s 
opportunities to participate in control and membership in a GESPA is substantially below that for 
members in cooperatives. Indeed in many interviews we heard views expressed that GESPA 
membership was widely regarded as a “second class” form of membership. Hence, 
unsurprisingly, as we see from Table 1, membership levels in GESPAs were much lower than in 




much less developed (from Table 1 we see that average INVOLVE in GESPAs was only about 
one tenth as large as in COOPs.) 
 From the perspective of employee ownership, all stores with conventional ownership in 
the Eroski chain, and unlike other Eroski stores, do not provide opportunities for employee 
ownership or special structures through which employees can participate in decision making. At 
the same time it is important to emphasize that all of these stores represent acquisitions of what 
were capitalist firms. As such many workers in these stores had worked for the previous 
capitalist owners. Now they experience working as part of a cooperative chain one feature of 
which is for all workers in all stores to be subject to key features of the same set of HR policies. 
The language contained in various internal company documents and the associated institutional 
arrangements strongly suggests that by working in a store within a coop chain, the lot of these 
continuing workers might be expected to have improved --arguably they are subject to better 
working conditions and better treatment by managers than previously. For example, the workers 
in these conventional stores are encouraged to participate in meetings and there are policies 
concerning meetings between employees and supervisors and annual development discussions 
even though they cannot, as in other stores in the group, become owner-members. Also there is a 
raft of policies that encourage training and skill formation. 8
So far as wage setting and employment are concerned in stores with conventional 
ownership, all workers (including non-members in cooperatives and GESPA and workers in 
 
                                                 
8 The need for such policies emerges from our discussions with managers at the chain who 
emphasized that the firm’s way of operating, or a key part of its competitive strategy, was that employees’ 
discretionary effort mattered for company performance. Employees are needed for more than just being 
there, and high turnover of employees is not desirable. This is reflected in the company’s written HRM 
strategy which emphasizes skill development of employees and the management capabilities of 
supervisors, and also career development and job rotation. These issues were also raised in our 
discussions with management members, suggesting genuine commitment to the HRM strategy. This 




these conventional firms,) receive no less than the wage rates that are set out in the collective 
agreement that is negotiated by the retail workers trade union  and which applies to all retail 
workers.  
Based on the preceding discussion we believe that our case is a good one in which to test 
propositions in three related area. Our key interest is in comparative performance, especially how  
cooperatives will perform compared to conventional firms (with no employee ownership). We 
are also interested in how well cooperatives perform compared to firms with modest degrees of 
employee ownership. The second questions concerns mechanisms--if there are productivity 
differences, what accounts for these differences? For example, what will be the impact of 
varying degrees of employee ownership and participatory practices (which vary across the three 
types of stores) on organizational performance? Third, what are the implications of these 
differences in organizational form for worker outcomes? While we know that cooperative 
members receive higher earnings than their peers in conventional stores, what is the situation 
concerning job satisfaction among workers in different stores? In the next section we review 
theoretical and empirical work emerging from different literatures that relates to these questions.  
 
III. Theory and Previous Empirical work  
 In this section our review of theoretical and empirical evidence in two areas is interwoven 
with references to the previous discussion of key institutional features at Eroski so that we end 
up with specific predictions for different types of stores 
(1) Comparative Performance 
 For majority EOFs, the economic theory of the LMF yields conflicting predictions 




concerning the expected comparative performance of EOFs and conventional firms.9
 Turning to the empirical literature,
 Much of 
the early influential theoretical work (e.g., Vanek, 1970) argued that co-operative firms would 
generate very strong incentives for labor resulting in high technical efficiency of labor. By 
contrast other studies were more pessimistic concerning the expected performance of PCs. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that productivity will be 
lower in a cooperative because efficient monitoring of workers requires the monitor to be the 
claimant on the firm's profits and that the cost of monitoring increases with the number of 
monitors. Another influential paper is Holmstrom (1982) who argues that effort level is expected 
to be beset with free-rider problems and thus sub-optimal when work takes place in teams (as is 
expected to be the case in manufacturing PCs). These pioneering theoretical papers have elicited 
a voluminous amount of responses and theoretical objections. Thus Macleod (1988) shows how, 
in a repeated game framework, effort supply in LMFs need not be below that in conventional 
firm. Others point to different benefits of PCs. Thus cooperatives are expected to be more 
productive than conventional firms because incentives (financial participation), peer group 
pressure (horizontal monitoring) and the close identification of cooperative members with the 
firm will elicit greater effort from workers (Jones and Svejnar, 1985; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987). 
Subsequent work (reviewed in Bonin et al. 1993; Dow, 2003) also recognized that predictions 
are more nuanced once it is recognized that “real world” LMFs may not have 100% membership.  
10
                                                 
9 See Bonin, Jones, and Putterman (1993), Jones and Pliskin (1991) and Dow (2003) for surveys. 
often the relative performance of conventional firms 
and PCs has been estimated by comparing subsample means of measures such as value added per 
10 One general point to note is that studies of technical efficiency in retailing, are thin on the 
ground. For cooperatives, an early investigation of British retail cooperatives is Jones (1987). So far as 
studies of the impact of HR on business performance in retailing is concerned prior work include Ben-Ner 




worker using data on both conventional firms and cooperatives.11  Most econometric evidence 
has been obtained from samples exclusively of producer cooperatives.12, 13,14 A few studies have 
estimated production functions using data on both conventional firms and cooperatives.15 
Amongst these perhaps most noteworthy is Craig and Pencavel (1995) who carefully gathered 
data for plywood cooperatives and conventional firms in the Pacific Northwest in that industry. 
The authors estimate separate Cobb Douglas production functions for several types of firms 
including cooperatives and conventional firms. They find that cooperatives are between 6 and 
14% more efficient than the principal conventional firms though there is little difference between 
the efficiency of the unionized and classical mills. More recently Jones (2007) also assembles 
data for conventional firms and PCs in the same industry, namely the Italian construction sector. 
However no evidence is found that cooperatives are more efficient than conventional firms.16
                                                 
11For example, George (1982). 
  In 
sum, it would seem that a reasonable conclusion based on the research to date for majority EOFs 
is that there is no strong evidence that either cooperatives or conventional firms have a sizeable 
and persistent significant edge in performance over other organizational forms. Equally it is 
12 Some exceptions are Jones (1987), Lee (1988), Berman and Berman (1989), Estrin (1991) and 
Craig and Pencavel (1995).   
13For example, see Defourney, Estrin, and Jones (1985), Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar (1987), and 
Jones and Svejnar (1985). 
14 Using estimates of how the productive efficiency of firms varied with respect to measures of 
financial and decision making participation, the authors of these studies estimated the efficiency of a 
typical cooperative relative to a firm with no worker participation. Since the samples of cooperatives 
often exhibited considerable variation over both firms and time in the degree of worker participation, the 
estimated productivity effects might be reliable.  However, other things remaining the same, one would 
prefer a sample of both conventional firms and cooperatives since the variance of the prediction errors is 
lower for observations that are similar to those in the sample than for atypical ones. 
15 George (1982), Jones (1987, 2007), Conte and Svejnar (1988), Lee (1988), Berman and 
Berman (1989), Estrin (1991) and Craig and Pencavel (1995). But only the papers by Jones, Lee, Estrin, 
Craig and Pencavel (1995) have focused on the relative technical efficiency of cooperatives. 
16 For Mondragon cooperatives, the only econometric study is Martin (2000). This unpublished 




apparent that there is a need for more targeted research. For example, the most frequently cited 
comparative study is probably that of Craig and Pencavel (1995).  However, while the quality of 
the data the authors use is most impressive arguably the robustness of the findings are somewhat 
diminished by the relatively small size of the data set (170 observations for 34 mills), and the use 
of a problematic measure of capital in the production function estimates. Also not all studies 
have taken into account key features of the institutional realities, such as the variation in 
membership amongst firms.  
While economic theory is ambiguous and empirical findings are unclear, based on that 
literature together with our knowledge of the institutions at Eroski (as discussed in section II), we 
make the following prediction concerning  the performance of Eroski co-ops. Even though the 
formal arrangements in Eroski cooperatives are somewhat short of what is envisaged in the pure 
theory case of the LMF, Eroski cooperatives do provide high levels of ownership and 
participation as well as substantial job security for members. Compared to non-members, front 
line workers benefit from receiving wage premia and high levels of training. We expect that 
these arrangements will lead to a more committed and motivated workforce who would expend 
more discretionary effort and work harder and smarter than the workforces in GESPA or 
conventional stores so that cooperatives are expected to display much higher levels of efficiency. 
Another source of performance advantage of cooperatives might stem from the possibility that 
high levels of peer monitoring in cooperatives would lead one to expect coop labor forces to 
have fewer layers of supervisors than in conventionally owned stores.17
For firms with minority EO and/or more limited employee involvement a body of 
  
                                                 
17 Agirre et. al (2010) argue that organizational commitment in cooperatives facilitates market 




theoretical and empirical literature suggests that an individual change in organizational design, 
such as modest employee ownership, is expected to be sufficient to produce sustained benefits to 
the firm.18 By contrast other literature argues that, for sustained benefits, complementary 
measures are needed. An individual initiative when introduced alone may be insufficient to lead 
to persistent gains. For example, employees might need more sharing of enterprise rewards 
through financial participation, such as employee stock ownership to accompany teams lest their 
commitment to teams becomes undermined (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, Ben-Ner and Jones, 
1995, and Kato and Morishima, 2002)  The empirical  literature often reports that the 
productivity-enhancing effects of individual practices introduced alone may be short-lived since 
initiatives lack a complementary mechanism, such as also delegating power to front-line workers 
(e.g., for quality circles, Levine, 1995 and Jones and Kato, 2011).  By contrast, and broadly 
speaking, the empirical literature also finds evidence in support of such complementarities (e.g., 
between employee ownership and employee involvement, such as the shared capitalism studies 
of Freeman et. al, 2008, or for Japan Kato and Morishima (2002) or for UK firms, Pendleton and 
Robinson (2008).19
While economic theory for firms with minority ownership and control is ambiguous and 
empirical findings are unclear, our knowledge of the institutions at Eroski (as discussed earlier in 
section II) and that literature leads us to make the following prediction concerning performance 
in Eroski GESPAs. While GESPAs do provide a reasonable level of employee ownership and 
job security for members, the extent of employee involvement and financial participation is 
  
                                                 
18 See for example reviews in Blinder (1990) and in Blair and Kochan (2000). 
19 However, it is also important to recognize that there do not appear to be any studies that have 
investigated these propositions within a business that is a cooperative and part of an elaborate set of 




rather modest. In addition, front line workers in GESPA stores do not enjoy the wage premia that 
coop members receive. Also GESPA workforces tend to suffer from more divisions than do coop 
workforces because of lower membership ratios—not all permanent workers accept the offer of 
membership.  For reason such as these, the synergies between ownership and participation, 
especially compared to coop members, are muted and we would not expect GESPA stores to do 
nearly as well as cooperatives. Furthermore, while some of the institutional arrangements might 
be expected to result in worker members expending more discretionary effort and working 
harder and smarter than workforces in conventional stores, these feelings of being “second class 
members” might undermine such forces. Hence we have no strong expectations concerning 
GESPA performance compared to conventional stores.  
(2) Mechanisms 
 While as we have indicated above, the literature in the LMF tradition does draw attention 
to mechanisms that might account for underlying differences in performance (such as the role of 
peer monitoring), since the more recent literature on High Performance Work Systems (HPWS) 
addresses this topic more forcefully we will lean on that literature to guide this part of our 
empirical work. It points to the real possibility of an establishment boosting its performance by 
adopting a variety of complementary new work practices (often called High Performance Work 
Practices) and tapping into the ability of frontline workers to produce valuable local knowledge 
through their collective efforts; and dealing with local shocks autonomously through 
collaboration among themselves. Such diverse HPWPs are expected to be especially potent 
within a majority EOF. The following three key elements of the HPWS are often emphasized20
                                                 
20 See, for instance, Kochan and Osterman, 1994, Appelbaum, et. al. 2000 and Boning, 





  First, in the HPWS, front-line workers will be given opportunities to exert discretionary 
effort, acquire useful local knowledge, and share it with their co-workers, and higher-level 
managers.  The importance of providing such opportunities is self-explanatory.  After all, a key 
objective of the HPWS is to tap into frontline workers’ discretionary effort and ability to produce 
valuable local information and deal with local shocks. Without such opportunities, there will not 
be any performance gain.  
Providing workers with such opportunities to produce useful local knowledge and share it 
with management is not sufficient. Obviously if the interest of workers is not aligned with that of 
the firm, workers will have little incentive to put forth effort and produce performance-
enhancing local information and share it with management.  The interest alignment between 
workers and the firm in cooperatives is fostered by two types of human resource management 
policies: (i) financial participation schemes (such as employee ownership) by which the financial 
wellbeing of workers is more tied to the final success of the firm; and (ii) information sharing 
mechanisms through which management shares important information with workers, and fosters 
their loyalty and commitment to the firm.21
The third element concerns the matter of ability and skills development. Even if frontline 
workers are given an opportunity to produce valuable local knowledge and share it with 
management AND have the appropriate incentive to do so, such useful local information may 
never be generated or shared widely in the firm in the absence of appropriate ability and skill of 
workers. As such, careful screening, recruitment and sustained training are often an integral part 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
information and communication technologies and the HPWS (e.g., Black and Lynch, 2004). 
Unfortunately we do not have data on the use of such technologies.   
21 In addition, job security, which is a central feature at Mondragon, can be an important 
necessary condition for the High Performance Work System to function optimally. For the importance of 
job security in the participatory employment system such as the Japanese system, see for example Levine 




of the High Performance Work System. 
     Our expectation is that opportunities for employee involvement and training will be more 
extensive and economic incentives more powerful in cooperatives compared to other 
organizational forms and that, in turn, these differences in key mechanisms will help to account 
for differences in organizational performance.  
 
IV. INSIDER ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 
(1) Do COOP stores outperform other stores?  
To capture the performance effects of differences in ownership structure, we estimate the 
following first-difference model: 
For hypermarkets, 
(1) ∆lnQit = βL∆lnLit + βcCOOPi + βm∆MARKETit + βyYEAROPENEDi  
+ additional controls  + ∆εit 
For supermarkets,  
(2) ∆lnQit = βL∆lnLit + βcCOOPi + βgGESPAi + βm ∆MARKETit + βyYEAROPENEDi  
+ additional controls  + ∆εit 
where Δ indicates the first difference between month t and t-1; Qit is output (real sales) in store i 
in month t; Lit is employment (measured by the number of full-time equivalent workers) in store 
i in month t; COOPi is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if store i is a coop store, 0 
otherwise; and GESPAi is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if store i is a GESPA store, 0 
otherwise. In addition to labor (L), store space is often considered crucial capital input (K) in 
retail service production (see, for instance, Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2006). For all Eroski 




zero and hence in our first-difference model, ∆lnKit = 0.  
 Note that during the period of time under study no store changed its ownership type, and 
that COOPi and GESPAi are time-invariant. In essence, we are estimating the effect on sales 
growth (which is equal to ∆lnQit) as opposed to the level of sales (Qit) of ownership types. The 
extensive field research that we conducted at Eroski (in particular, repeated interviews with our 
key informant as well as multiple managers) led us to believe that sales growth is indeed a 
primary business goal of Eroski. Our focus on sale growth as a key performance measure is 
consistent with what Eroski uses to gauge each store’s performance.    
To make sure that the estimated coefficients on COOPi and GESPAi are capturing the 
pure employee ownership effects, we include a number of controls. First and perhaps most 
important, a store located in a rapidly growing market with rising population and average 
household income will naturally experience a faster growth of sales. If a disproportionately 
higher proportion of COOP stores are located in such rapidly growing markets as compared to 
other stores and we fail to control for such a location effect, we will not be able to separate the 
performance effect of COOP from the locatio effect. To control for such differences in the store 
location’s market condition, we include ∆MARKETit where MARKETit is monthly market index 
in month t for the area which store i serves. The monthly market index is provided by the 
Spanish National Statistical Institute, and is considered one of the most authoritative market 
indicators in Spain.     
Second, we consider YEAROPENEDi = the year store i was opened. We have been told 
by our informants at Eroski that due to the standard lifecycle model of retail stores, younger 
stores tend to grow faster than older stores. YEAROPENEDi will control for such a lifecycle 




Third, we also include constant (to capture an Eroski-wide time trend which is common 
to all Eroski stores regardless of its ownership types), monthly dummy variables (to capture 
seasonality of retail sales), and year dummy variables (to control for year time effects) as 
additional controls.22
Finally, as in the case of any fixed effect/first-difference model, our first-difference 
model controls for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of stores that may be correlated with 
the level of real sales.     
  
Table 2 reports the OLS estimates of Eq. (1).23
                                                 
22 We also consider a full set of interaction terms involving monthly dummy variables and year 
dummy variables. Our main results change little with the use of such a full set of interaction terms though 
there is slight efficiency loss. These as well as all other unreported results are available upon request from 
the corresponding author.     
 For hypermarkets, as shown in the first 
column, the estimated coefficient on COOP is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, 
confirming that COOP stores grow faster than GESPA stores, ceteris paribus. The size of the 
estimated coefficient suggests a plausible growth rate advantage of COOP stores over GESPA 
stores, i.e., on average each month COOP stores grow faster than GESPA stores by 0.2 
percentage points (or 2.4 percentage points per year). The estimated coefficients on the control 
variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Specifically, the estimated 
coefficient on ∆lnLit is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and the size of the 
coefficient implies that the output elasticity of labor in the underlying Cobb-Douglas production 
function is a little over 0.5. We also find the estimated coefficient on ∆MARKETit to be positive 
and significant at the 1 percent level, confirming that a store located in a rapidly growing market 
with rising population and average household income will experience a significantly faster 
growth of sales, and hence that it is important to control for the market conditions of the store 




location. Finally, the estimated coefficient on YEAROPENEDi is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level, suggesting that young stores indeed grow faster than old stores. This finding is 
consistent with the lifecycle model of retail stores as expounded by our informant at Eroski.   
As shown in the second column of the table, for supermarkets, we find no evidence for 
the growth rate advantage of COOP stores -- the estimated coefficient on COOP is very small 
(actually negative) and highly insignificant. Our failure to find any significant difference in sales 
growth between COOP and GESPA stores for supermarkets  did not surprise our key informant 
at Eroski who pointed out the large heterogeneity of stores in supermarkets as a possible reason 
for the finding. He then suggested us to focus on a particular subgroup of supermarkets, called 
Supermarket City. Supermarket City is essentially a group of supermarket stores that are smaller 
than other supermarkets and are still somewhat reminiscent of intimate, small neighborhood 
groceries. As such, having “better customer service” employees is particularly important for 
Supermarket City. A major strength of COOP stores lies in the fact that COOP helps employees 
develop a sense of ownership and hence makes them more committed employees who are willing 
and capable of providing closer and helpful attention to their customers. Such a COOP advantage 
is probably more relevant to Supermarket City than other supermarkets. In short, we are more 
likely to detect a positive performance effect of COOP in the market segment of Supermarket 
City.  
The last column of Table 2 reports the results for Supermarket City. Reassuringly the 
estimated coefficient on COOP is now positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The size of the estimated coefficient implies a considerable 0.7 percentage-point growth rate 
advantage enjoyed by COOP stores in the market segment of Supermarket City over 




segment).   
(2) How do COOP stores outperform other stores?  
 Our earlier discussion of the theoretical literature drew attention to the potential role of 
various mechanisms within cooperatives that might help to account for a productivity edge. In 
this section we highlight the role of three key elements. First are opportunities for employee 
involvement. From the discussion in section II we saw that diverse opportunities existed for 
employee involvement in Eroski cooperatives. In measuring the extent of variation in employee 
involvement opportunities across different types of stores we use INVOLVEi (the monthly 
average for store i during the time period under study of the proportion of scheduled work hours 
spent on joint labor-management meetings). We use the monthly average during the entire time 
period under study to gauge the extent of employee involvement opportunities at each store, for 
it is implausible that the strength of employee involvement at each store changes from month to 
month.   
As shown in Table 1, for both hypermarkets and supermarkets, COOP stores allow for 
much more employee involvement than other stores. For instance, the proportion of scheduled 
working hours spent on joint labor-management meetings at the store level per month 
(INVOLVE) was on average 0.24 percent for COOP Hypermarket stores as opposed to only 0.02 
percent for GESPA Hypermarket stores. Likewise, the average INVOLVE was 0.44 percent for 
COOP stores in the market segment of Supermarket City as opposed to negligible 0.002 percent 
for conventional stores in the same market segment. As such, it is plausible that COOP stores 
outperform other stores in part by providing their employee owners with more opportunities to 
produce useful local knowledge and respond effectively to local shocks.  




involvement opportunities. From our earlier institutional discussion we believe that STAKEi = 
average stake of employee owners (monthly average of store i during the time period under 
study) represents the most important part of financial incentives at Eroski, though clearly other 
incentives exist, such as annual distribution of surplus.24
 In addition to STAKEi, our data provide yet another dimension of the overall strength of 
incentives, MEMBERi= proportion of workers who are COOP or GESPA members (monthly 
average of store i during the time period under study). While STAKE captures the intensity of 
incentives (how big a deal it is for the average employee owner to help her store outcompete its 
competitors), MEMBER measures the scope of incentives (what proportion of the total labor 
force in the store has some stake in the firm).  As shown in Table 1, COOP stores tend to have 
considerably higher proportions of employees with some stake in the firm.  
 Table 1 shows that workers in COOP 
hypermarket stores have a stake in their firm that is more than thirteen times as big as that of the 
average member-worker in a GESPA hypermarket store. (Unsurprisingly for supermarket stores 
in the segment of Supermarket City, employees in conventional stores have no stake in the firm).  
Again, the HPWS literature suggests that employees in COOP stores have stronger incentives to 
take advantage of employee involvement opportunities; produce valuable local knowledge; and 
respond quickly and effectively to local shocks without invoking lengthy formal involvement of 
supervisors. It follows that COOP stores outperform other stores.  
 The third crucial feature is the emphasis on training and skill formation in cooperatives. 
                                                 
24 Individual ownership stakes receive a return that is more or less guaranteed--an interest rate 
reflecting market rates. Also, if there is a surplus (profit) part of this is distributed to owners as a bonus which 
is also proportional to STAKE. There is, however, another relatively small part of the surplus that goes to 
workers-- a kind of profit sharing, which is not proportional to STAKE. In sum, it is safe to assume that most 
of the annual distribution of surplus that goes to members is proportional to STAKE (in their role as capital 
providers), and that STAKE will measure the strength of financial incentive for employees accurately. 




Fortunately our data allow us to construct TRAININGi = proportion of scheduled hours spent on 
training in general (monthly average of store i during the time period under study). Table 1 
shows a somewhat mixed picture. For hypermarkets, COOP stores on average devote less time to 
training than GESPA stores whereas for supermarkets in the Supermarket-City segment, COOP 
stores on average devote more time to training than conventional stores. However, our data do 
not provide information on the amount of HPWS-relevant training (such as problem solving; 
team work; customer relations). This measurement issue makes it somewhat difficult to interpret 
the results on training.  
 Specifically, we estimate the following first-difference model: 
(3) ∆lnQit = βL∆lnLit + βhHPWPi + ∆MARKETit + YEAROPENEDi  
+ additional controls  + ∆εit 
For HPWPi, as discussed above, we consider INVOLVEi, STAKEi, MEMBERi, and 
TRAININGi. Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of Eq. (3) for the Hypermarket segment. Overall 
the results are supportive of predictions drawn from the HPWP PARADIGM. All estimated 
coefficients have the expected positive sign and two of them are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (INVOLVEi, and STAKEi).  
As shown in Table 4, the estimates of Eq. (3) for a subgroup of City Supermarket stores 
are less precise and mostly insignificant although the estimated coefficient on MEMBERi is 
close to being statistically significant at the 10 percent level.25
 
  
                                                 
25 We also estimated a fully nested version of Eq. (3) with all four HPWP variables considered 
simultaneously. The results, which are available upon request, turned out to be quite robust to the use of 
such a fully nested specification although the estimates are slightly less precise due to multicollinearity as 




V. Worker Outcomes and the Role of Job Satisfaction 
Though the main objective of the paper is to investigate the effect on organizational 
performance of cooperatives, we will provide suggestive evidence on the effects on worker 
outcomes (especially job satisfaction) of cooperatives. What cooperatives imply for worker 
outcomes is an important research question in its own right. However, a study of the implications 
of cooperatives for worker outcomes will also provide potentially valuable insight on the nature 
and sustainability of cooperatives as a high performance work system.   
In the literature on HPWS, there is an ongoing debate over the consequences of HPWS 
for worker outcomes. While some argue that HPWS produces gains for both firms and workers 
(e.g., Appelbaum, et. al, 2000),  Godard, (2001 and 2004) argues that HPWS may make work 
more intense and stressful, thus resulting in more worker discontent. There is also a literature 
that argues that in organizations with well developed systems providing for employee 
involvement, work expectations are apt to be unrealistically high. For example in their cross 
national study of the extent of employee involvement in Europe in the 1970s, International 
Research Group (1981) found that worker satisfaction with arrangements in countries with well 
developed formal arrangements  for employee participation (such as in Yugoslavia) was lower 
than in many places with more rudimentary schemes. 
 While the available empirical work is rather limited, there appears to be a similar 
division in the literature concerning majority EOFs and cooperatives. Most studies have 
investigated the US plywood cooperatives.  Thus while Greenberg (1986) finds higher levels of 
job satisfaction in the cooperatives, Long (1982) finds no relationship between ownership stake 
and job satisfaction.  While Rooney (1984) finds evidence of lower injury rates among workers 




Grunberg and Greenberg (1996) find a poorer safety record in cooperatives. To some degree this 
murky picture emerging from previous work on job satisfaction and related outcomes in 
cooperatives reflects the use of what are tiny and apparently non-representative samples.  
For the case of Eroski, we do know that worker-members in cooperatives receive 
substantially higher earnings compared to their peers in other stores within Eroski. At the same 
time we have no clear cut predictions as to what to expect to find concerning job satisfaction. 
While many of the features of cooperative membership, such as high levels of employee 
involvement and high wages can be expected to lead to high levels of job satisfaction, such 
owner-workers may also work harder and be subject to higher levels of stress than others. They 
are also apt to have much higher levels of expectations from working in cooperatives (than do 
workers elsewhere), expectations which, in certain circumstances, may be easily frustrated.  
To investigate the implications of differences in organizational structure for job 
satisfaction, we are fortunate to have access to micro data for all workers in Eroski hypermarkets 
(n=4328). These data were collected from a worker s survey conducted in all Eroski 
hypermarkets (including both COOP and GESPA stores) in 2008. On a 5 point scale, workers are 
asked to assign a numerical value to their level of satisfaction (with 5 being the most satisfied) in 
response to each of 68 questions concerning various aspects of working lives and work 
environment.  
To capture the level of overall worker satisfaction, following Bartel et al. (2003), we use 





To provide more rigorous evidence on the satisfaction gap between COOP and GESPA, 
we estimate the following equation: 
 The average EAI was 3.36 and 3.60 for workers in COOP and workers in 
GESPA respectively, suggesting that the overall level of job satisfaction is actually lower for 
workers in COOP stores than in GESPA stores.  
(4) EAIi = α + β1COOPi + β2∆lnQi + β4∆lnMARKETi  
+ β4YEAROPENEDi + β5MALEi + β6BASQUEi  
+ additional controls  + εi 
where EAIi = EAI of worker i; COOPi = 1 if worker i works for a COOP store, zero otherwise;  
∆lnQi = annual average of monthly sales growth rates during 2007 of the store for which worker 
i works; ∆MARKETi = annual average of monthly growth rates of market index during 2007 of 
the store for which worker i works; YEAROPENEDi = year opened of the store for which 
worker i works;  MALEi = 1 if worker i is male, zero otherwise; and BASQUEi = 1 if worker i 
filled out the questionnaire in Basque, 0 otherwise (each worker was allowed to fill out the 
questionnaire either in Spanish or in Basque).  Additional controls include occupational dummy 
variables; tenure dummy variables; and worker status (temporary or permanent) dummy 
variables.  
 The OLS estimates of Eq. (4) are presented in Table 4. Column (i) confirms that the level 
of overall worker satisfaction is indeed significantly lower in COOP than in GESPA, after 
controlling for a variety of individual and store characteristics. Column (ii) shows the OLS 
estimates of Eq. (4) augmented by an interaction term involving both COOPi and ∆lnQi. The 
                                                 
26 We experimented with alternative ways of capturing job satisfaction by constructing measures that 
use a narrower set of questions as well as a principal component analysis. Findings were largely insensitive to 




estimated coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level, suggesting that the negative satisfaction effect of COOP is mediated when store 
performance (sales growth) improves. Or conversely the negative satisfaction effect of COOP 
will be amplified when store performance worsens.  
 One interpretation of these findings is that Eroski’s COOP stores can be viewed as 
majority EOFs that employ key mechanisms that constitute a high-powered High-Performance 
Work System.  These co-op stores are more efficient and COOP workers have bigger financial 
stakes and voice, and also receive higher wages. However, employee owners with high stakes in 
the firm are expected to go beyond routine work and to engage in a variety of problem solving 
activities. Consistent with the arguments of those who do not expect HPWPs to produce 
consistent gains for both firms and employees (e.g. Godard, 2001), such workplaces can be quite 
demanding and stressful. Interestingly in cooperatives, and in contrast to what has sometimes 
been found for conventionally owned firms with HPWPs, stress is highest when sales growth is 
relatively weak.  An alternative interpretation of the finding is that by being significant 
stakeholders, COOP workers at Mondragon probably expect more from their work, resulting in 
high expectations and a higher likelihood of disappointment. Such workplace disappointment 
may be particularly acute when their hard work does not result in performance improvement. 
 In sum, our evidence on low job satisfaction in cooperatives points to a need for 
somewhat nuanced understanding of cooperatives as a HPWS.    
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 Recent years have seen a massive growth in employee ownership around the world. A 




performance of such firms, but it is inconclusive concerning the comparative performance of 
EOFs and conventional firms, as well as the comparative performance of firms with majority and 
minority EO. The evidence also shows how employee ownership has assumed a wide variety of 
forms, including the producer cooperative in which majority control and ownership is vested in 
the workforce. Amongst such labor managed firms, one example that has attracted close and 
sustained attention by researchers are the Mondragon cooperatives. In this paper, we are 
fortunate to use the first micro-econometric evidence for a Mondragon cooperative and, since 
stores fall into three distinct ownership categories, we are able to contribute to some of these 
debates. 
 By estimating first difference equations we find: (i) hypermarket stores with cooperative 
ownership outperform GESPA stores; (ii) for supermarkets, the picture is more nuanced. Small 
“city” supermarkets, those with cooperative ownership, are more productive than Eroski stores 
that are conventionally owned. However for larger supermarkets, conventional owned stores 
grow faster than both cooperatives and GESPA. These findings are supported by a series of 
robustness checks. 
 We also provide additional evidence that bears on the mechanisms that help to explain 
why cooperatives are better-performers. This evidence is consistent with those who argue that 
cooperatives are better performers because cooperative members work under institutional 
arrangements that differ from those facing workers in other firms. Specifically, compared to 
workers in other firms, cooperative members have opportunities for substantial employee 
involvement and training and also strong incentives because they have a large financial stake in 
the firm. Cooperative members also have unusual job security and they work in firms with 




attribute the failure to find an effect for more moderate combinations of employee ownership and 
employee involvement to the absence in GESPAs of many of the factors that underpin the 
cooperative advantage.   
Overall our findings tend to lend support to those who cast doubt on the unconditional 
supremacy of the Anglo-American shareholder model of corporate governance and advocate 
employee ownership and shared capitalism as a viable and possibly even superior alternative to 
the Anglo-American shareholder model. While it is unclear whether our findings apply equally 
to the retail industry in other countries, we do note that evidence for the potential importance of 
innovative work practices does exist for retailing elsewhere (e.g. for the UK, Jones, 1987 and for 
Finland, Jones et al. , 2009.) At the same time we do not believe that our findings imply that 
employee-owned enterprises are a universal panacea.  
First, while cooperative members are substantially better paid than their peers in 
comparable firms, when we use individual-level data to investigate job satisfaction among 
workers in differing forms of organization we find that job satisfaction is lower for workers in 
cooperatives than for GESPA workers. Though this may be a reflection of high worker 
expectation in cooperatives, cooperatives may well be indeed a “high-stress work system”.  The 
overall assessment of cooperatives will need to be nuanced.   
Second, clearly there are limitations to our approach--econometric case studies cannot 
easily address concerns about selectivity and external validity (Jones et al., 2006). In the context 
of our study, compared to firms examined in other studies, many potentially important features 
of the cooperative model are apparently especially well developed among Eroski stores, such as 
the existence of high membership ratios and average ownership stakes that are far bigger than in 




Eroski might help to explain our findings--the effects of cooperation that exist here than are more 
powerful than have been found in other cases. Likewise, even within Mondragon, we are not 
entirely sure that our findings are applicable to the industrial and banking sectors of Mondragon, 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Sources: : Individual store-level monthly data from February 2006 through May 2008 provided by Eroski.  
Note: Standard Deviation in parentheses.  
Definitions of the Variable 
Qit=real sales of store i in time t;  
Lit=number of all full-time equivalent workers working in store i in time t  
MARKETit=monthly market index of the area served by store i in time t  
YEAROPENEDi = year in which store i was initially opened.  
INVOLVEi = proportion of scheduled hours spent on joint labor-management meetings (monthly average of store i during the time period under 
study) 
STAKEi = average stake of employee owners (average of all employee owners of store i as of March 2008) 
MEMBERi = proportion of workers who are COOP or GESPA members (monthly average of store i during the time period under study) 
TRAININGi = proportion of scheduled hours spent on training (monthly average of store i during the time period under study) 
 Hypermarkets Supermarkets 
                            All                SUPERMARKET CITY 
COOP GESPA COOP GESPA Conventional COOP Conventional 
∆lnQit .0021048 -.0004499 .0042155 .0060926 .0053058 .0104688 .0019786 
 (.166259) (.234495) (.159047) (.169218) (.174939) (.182554) (.116191) 
∆lnLit .0003716 -.0016009 .0023519 .0039068 .0024821 .0068902 .0022351 
 (.04335) (.066897) ( .09743) (.061481) (.087372) (.139007) (.102414) 
∆MARKETit .0034202   .0035085 .002913 .003626 .003759 .0028605 .0012249 
 (.115210) (.107146) (.112875) (.096741) (.104789) (.115623) (.099853) 
YEAROPENEDi 1995.48 1999.904 1998.405 2000.626 1999.364 2000.18 2002.053 
 (5.46753) (4.49017) (4.74845) (2.77468) (4.94237) (2.52702) (1.84229) 
INVOLVEi .0024464 .0002408 .0033306 .0011858 2.23e-06 .0044161 .0000192 
 (.004767) (.000727) (.005705) (.003443) (.000126) (.008445) (.000332) 
STAKEi 33295.79 2511.332 26270.68 865.6311 1.398661 23030.07 0 
 (8847.05) (1010.40) (8175.98) (201.354) (23.56457) (10545.04) (0) 
MEMBERi .7589575 .6075966 .7289384 .5180572 0 .6442763 0 
 (.073878) (.135189) (.118557) (.153238) (0) (.1549173) (0) 
TRAININGi .0074278 .0080867 .0138549 .0102537 .0062481 .0108354 .0059075 
 (.01298) (.015204) (.038580) (.021452) (.053389) (.041531) (.012875) 
N 675 1420 4747 703 8001 967 321 
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Table 2 Sales Growth and Ownership Types: Insider Econometric Evidence  
Dependent variable=∆lnQit 

























GESPAi  -0.0001 
[-0.10] 
 
N 2070 10994 1195 
R-squared 0.852 0.404 0.311 
Sources: : Individual store-level monthly data from February 2006 through May 2008 provided 
by Eroski.  
Notes:  
1. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses (t statistics are based on standard errors that 
are robust and clustered at the individual store level). 
2. All models include constant and monthly dummy and year dummy variables.  
3. For Hypermarket, all stores are either COOP or GESPA and hence the omitted reference 
category is GESPA. For Supermarket, there are COOP, GESPA and conventional stores and the 
omitted reference category is conventional stores. For Supermarket City only, there are only 
COOP and conventional stores and hence the omitted reference category is conventional stores.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 
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Table 3 Sales Growth and HRM for Hypermarkets: Additional Evidence 
Dependent variable=∆lnQit 



























   
STAKEi   6.2x10-8*** 
[2.74] 
  
MEMBERi   0.0037 
[1.01] 
 
TRAININGi    0.255 
[1.15] 
     
N 2070 1889 2070 2070 
R-squared 0.852 0.847 0.852 0.852 
Sources: Individual store-level monthly data from February 2006 through May 2008 provided by 
Eroski.  
Notes:  
1. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses (t statistics are based on standard errors that 
are robust and clustered at the individual store level). 
2. All models include constant and monthly dummy and year dummy variables.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 
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 Table 4 Sales Growth and HRM for Supermarket City: Additional Evidence 
Dependent variable=∆lnQit 



























   
STAKEi   2.26x10-8 
[0.29] 
  
MEMBERi   0.0069 
[1.51] 
 
TRAININGi    -0.047 
[-0.67] 
N 1195 1195 1195 1195 
R-squared 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 
Sources: Individual store-level monthly data from February 2006 through May 2008 provided by 
Eroski.  
Notes:  
1. Absolute values of t staistics are in parentheses (t staistics are based on standard errors that are 
robust and clustered at the individual store level). 
2. All models include constant and monthly dummy and year dummy variables.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 Table 5 Worker Satisfaction and Ownership Types 
Dependent variable=EAIi  
 (i))  ((ii)(ii)II)  
COOP
i






































  -.066*** 
[-2.64]  








OCCUPATION  Controlled  Controlled  
TENURE  Controlled  Controlled  
STATUS Controlled  Controlled  
N   4328  4328  
R-squared 0.124  0.126  
Sources: Employee Survey conducted by Eroski in 2008.  
Notes:  
1. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses  
2. All models include constant.  
3. See text for variable definitions. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 
  
 
 
  
 
